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EVIDENTIAL REASONING FOR
FORENSIC READINESS
Yi-Ching Liao and Hanno Langweg
Norwegian University of Science and Technology
Teknologivn. 22, 2815 Gjøvik, Norway
{yi-ching.liao2, hanno.langweg}@ntnu.no

ABSTRACT
To learn from the past, we analyse 1,088 “computer as a target” judgments for evidential reasoning by extracting four case elements: decision, intent, fact, and evidence. Analysing the
decision element is essential for studying the scale of sentence severity for cross-jurisdictional
comparisons. Examining the intent element can facilitate future risk assessment. Analysing
the fact element can enhance an organization’s capability of analysing criminal activities
for future offender profiling. Examining the evidence used against a defendant from previous judgments can facilitate the preparation of evidence for upcoming legal disclosure.
Following the concepts of argumentation diagrams, we develop an automatic judgment summarizing system to enhance the accessibility of judgments and avoid repeating past mistakes. Inspired by the feasibility of extracting legal knowledge for argument construction
and employing grounds of inadmissibility for probability assessment, we conduct evidential
reasoning of kernel traces for forensic readiness. We integrate the narrative methods from
attack graphs/languages for preventing confirmation bias, the argumentative methods from
argumentation diagrams for constructing legal arguments, and the probabilistic methods
from Bayesian networks for comparing hypotheses.
Keywords: legal knowledge extraction, forensic readiness, evidential reasoning, kernel tracing, attack description languages, argumentation diagrams, Bayesian networks

1.

INTRODUCTION

“A case is only as strong as its evidence”
(Torpey, 2009). Many computer crime cases
are closed due to the lack of evidence, and
the most common reason is not preparing
for upcoming legal disclosure at all, which
is equivalent to covering the tracks for perpetrators (Rowlingson, 2004). Moreover,
covering the tracks has become the standard operating procedure for perpetrators
(Graves, 2007). To meet the burden of proof,
we should establish an information retention
c 2016 ADFSL

strategy to prepare for upcoming legal disclosure (International Organization for Standardization, 2015), instead of merely relying
on the evidence remained.
Since digital evidence is more susceptible to tampering and subsequent modification than traditional documents, it causes
more uncertainties in legal cases, such as
using the Trojan horse defense to avoid a
conviction (Brenner, Carrier, & Henninger,
2004). What is worse, forged digital evidence
can result in miscarriages of justice, such as
Page 37
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framing victims by planting digital evidence.
To prevent miscarriages of justice caused by
false evidence, we have to consider evidence
reliability early in the collection phase by
choosing more reliable evidence sources, instead of merely securing evidence with tamper resistance and detection techniques later
in the preservation phase.
To facilitate the preparation of reliable evidence before the occurrence of legal actions,
we emphasise the domain of computer crime
and analyse the ”computer as a target” judgments for evidential reasoning through case
element extraction in Section 2. Inspired by
the effectiveness of case elements and the
feasibility of transforming them into argumentation diagrams, we integrate the narrative methods, the argumentative methods,
and the probabilistic methods to produce
scenarios through attack graphs/languages,
generate hypotheses through argumentation
diagrams, and assess probabilities through
Bayesian networks in Section 3. Section 4
concludes the paper with the discussion of
the effectiveness of method integration for
evidential reasoning.

2. ANALYSING
JUDGMENTS FOR
EVIDENTIAL
REASONING
To learn from the past, we analyse 1,088
“computer as a target” judgments through
language engineering techniques for evidential reasoning. We explain our analysis
methods and findings as follows:

2.1

Related Work

Distinguished from previous studies on legal knowledge extraction, we emphasise the
analysis of “computer as a target” judgements written in Chinese characters from
four case elements: decision, intent, fact,
Page 38

and evidence. Table 1 presents a comparative analysis of previous research on legal text summarization and analysis from
three perspectives: language, corpus, and elements. Previous studies mostly collect and
analyse judgments written in English, and
mainly focus on general criminal cases. To
extend the research scope, we emphasise the
domain of computer crime and analyse the
”computer as a target” judgments for evidential reasoning.

2.2

Collecting “Computer as a
Target” Judgments

The criminal activities targeting at computers demand more technical knowledge
than the activities utilizing computers as
tools. Therefore, we emphasise the analysis of “computer as a target” judgments for
evidential reasoning. Since different jurisdictions have their own computer crime laws,
we need to employ different search terms
based on the corresponding computer crime
laws for judgment collection.
Chinese judgments are available at the
website wenshu.court.gov.cn (China Judgements Online) for public access. The Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China
clearly differentiates between the “computer
as a target” crime and the “computer as
a tool” crime in separate articles. Therefore, we employ “computer information system” as the search term for “case name”
to collect judgments regarding “illegal invasion of computer information system” and
“deleting, altering, adding or jamming the
functions of the computer information system” (Council of Europe, 2008). We employ Scrapy (Scrapinghub, Ltd., 2015), an
open source Web crawler, and utilize the
XML path language to locate and retrieve
the judgment content. We categorize the
collected Chinese judgments into two judgment types: first instance and appeal. We
c 2016 ADFSL
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Table 1. A Summary of Research on Legal Text Summarization and Analysis
Author(s)

Language

Gelbart and Smith

English

Schweighofer et al.

English

Uyttendaele et al.

Dutch

Farzindar and Lapalme English
Hachey and Grover

English

Saravanan et al.

English

Chieze et al.

English
French

Wyner

English

Yousfi-Monod et al.

English
French

Galgani et al.

English

Corpus
Elements
more than 1000 economic loss cases and
legal concepts, statute citations, case citations,
general British Columbia cases
and facts
75 full text documents of court decisions
index with the thesaurus entries
from the European Community law database
superscription, victim, accused, alleged offenses,
more than 3000 decisions
transition formulation, opinion of the court,
from the correctional Court of Leuven
legal foundations, verdict, and conclusion
3500 judgments from
four thematic segmentations: introduction, context,
the Federal Court of Canada
juridical analysis, and conclusion
seven rhetorical annotations: fact, proceedings,
188 judgments from the UK House of Lords
background, framing, disposal, textual, and other
seven rhetorical roles: identifying the case,
200 judgments related to rent control,
establishing facts of the case, arguing the case,
income tax and sales tax
history of the case, arguments,
ratio of the decision, and final decision
14,380 historical decisions from Canadian
four thematic segments (Mailhot & Carnwath, 1998):
federal courts and provincial tribunals
introduction, context, reasoning, and conclusion
47 criminal cases drawn from the California
case citations, names of parties, roles of parties,
Supreme Court and State Court of Appeal
and final decision
four decision sections: introduction, context,
3715 decisions from the Canadian courts
reasoning and conclusion
5705 case reports
collected catchphrases, such as courts and judges,
from the Federal Court of Australia
corporations, costs, etc.

found 26 duplicated judgments, two judgments without content, and four irrelevant
judgments while collecting Chinese judgments.
As for Taiwan, the Judicial Yuan makes
legislative and judicial texts accessible at
the website jirs.judicial.gov.tw, and we utilize “offenses against the computer security”
as the search term for “cause of action”
and “criminal case” as “judgment type” for
judgment collection. Since certain character in the case number represents different
judgment types, we can categorize the collected Taiwanese judgments into six judgment types: prosecution, summary judgment, appeal, civil action, private prosecution, and mediation. The most common
types of Taiwanese judgments are prosecution and summary judgment, which form
88.9% of the collected Taiwanese judgments.
The average character count of summary
judgments is around half of the prosecution
judgments, which are 2820.58, and 5801.13
respectively. We also found two duplicated
judgments while collecting Taiwanese judgments. Until May 29th 2016, we totally colc 2016 ADFSL

lect 1,088 “computer as a target” judgments:
358 Chinese judgments and 730 Taiwanese
judgments.
Figure 1 shows the number of “computer
as a target” judgments by judgment year.
The Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China incriminates “illegal invasion of
computer information system” and “deleting, altering, adding or jamming the functions of the computer information system” in
1997, whereas Criminal Code of the Republic
of China incriminates “offenses against the
computer security” in 2003. However, there
is only one Chinese judgment concerning
“computer as a target” crime before 2011,
and the number of judgments collected in
China is less than in Taiwan. The number
of “computer as a target” judgments is much
less than expected considering the number of
incidents reported.

2.3

Extracting Case Elements

To analyse the “computer as a target” judgments for evidential reasoning, we determine four case elements for legal knowledge
extraction: decision, intent, fact, and eviPage 39
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Figure 1. Number of “computer as a target”
Judgments by Year
dence. Examining the decision element is
essential for studying the scale of sentence
severity, which can serve as a criterion for
cross-jurisdictional comparisons. Analysing
the intent element is indispensable to threat
analysis, which can facilitate future risk assessment. Examining the fact element can
enhance an organization’s capability of understanding criminal behaviours for future
offender profiling. Analysing the evidence
used against a defendant from previous judgments can facilitate the preparation of evidence before the occurrence of legal actions.
To extract case elements, we employ
five processing resources (Cunningham et
al., 2014) provided by GATE (Cunningham,
2002), an open source language engineering software, to locate annotations from the
“computer as a target” judgments, which we
list as follows:
1. RegEx Sentence Splitter annotates
sentences according to the files containing regular expressions of sentence
splits, which we utilize as the indicators
of different judgment stages: decision,
fact, and reasoning. Regarding a judgment as a transaction, Cheng (2010)
determines generic structures of Chinese and Taiwanese judgments by identifying various stages and legal functions. The orders of stages are different
between Chinese and Taiwanese judgPage 40
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ments, which are shown in Table 2. Chinese judgments establish the fact first,
then justify the decision, and finally declare the decision. On the other hand,
Taiwanese judgments declare the decision first, then establish the fact, and
eventually justify the decision.
Despite different stage orders, the case
elements exist within the same stages.
For Chinese judgments, we utilize RegEx
Sentence Splitter to locate the linguistic markers of the fact and evidence
elements, which we later extract the
first paragraph between them as the fact
element by JAPE Transducer. As for
Taiwanese judgments, we employ RegEx
Sentence Splitter to locate the linguistic markers as the separator between the decision and intent elements.
2. GATE Unicode Tokeniser
divides
judgments into smaller tokens, such
as punctuations and numbers.
We
customize GATE Unicode Tokeniser
to annotate one or more occurrences
of Unicode character between punctuations as a token, which we regard
as a sentence for further higher-level
annotations by JAPE Transducer.
3. ANNIE Gazetteer aims to search the
pre-defined words for further annotation by JAPE Transducer. We set the
“wholeWordsOnly” parameter to false
to allow ANNIE Gazetteer to match
not only whole words. Due to the
different judgment structures, we employ different linguistic markers to different jurisdictions, which are summarized in Table 2. Currently we generate these linguistic markers manually
through analysing the indicators of different judgment stages and case elements. We only update the linguistic markers to processing resources after
c 2016 ADFSL
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Table 2. The Analysis of Judgments for Case Element Extraction
Stage

Element
intent

fact
fact

reasoning evidence

decision

decision

fact

decision

decision

intent
fact

reasoning evidence

Linguistic Markers
China

Processing Resources

intent=[purpose, for, used]
the sentence which contains intent
fact start=[the prosecutor accused, procuratorate accused, after being examined]
evidence start=[the above fact, given with evidence, to support the above allegation]
the first paragraph between fact start and evidence start
evidence start=[the above fact, given with evidence, to support the above allegation]
evidence end =[this court thinks, sufficient to justify, is consistent with fact]
the sentences between evidence start and evidence end
decision start=[the decision is as follows, based on the defendant]
decision=[is sentenced]
after decision start, the sentence which contains decision
Taiwan
fact start=[reason, crime fact]
guilty=[detention, imprisonment, probation, fine]
length=[day, month, year, dollar]
other =[not guilty, dismissal, overrule, dismissal, jurisdictional error, summary judgement, grounds for appeal]
before fact start, the sentences which contain guilty and length or contain other
fact start=[reason, crime fact]
intent=[intent, intent, mens rea, based, for not, discontent]
after fact start, the sentence which contains intent
the paragraph after the sentence which contains intent
evidence list start=[evidence, evidence of fact, basis of fact, evidence name, evidence part, based on the evidence,
the following evidence, sufficient evidence to prove, the following evidence to prove]
evidence start=[based on, the above fact, the above crime fact, mainly based on, basis of crime fact]
evidence ref =[indictment, as reference]
after evidence list start, the sentences which contains parentheses
the paragraph which contains evidence start
the sentence which contains evidence ref

verifying the enhanced annotation coverage. However, the diverse usages of
legal terms by different judges obstruct
the automatic generation of linguistic
markers.
4. JAPE Transducer recognises higherlevel annotations through regular expressions. For example, after we utilize
ANNIE Gazetteer to locate the linguistic markers for the start of the decision
element “the decision is as follows” and
the keyword of the decision element “is
sentenced” from Chinese judgments, we
extract the sentences which contain “is
sentenced” after “the decision is as follows” as the decision elements by JAPE
Transducer.
5. Flexible Exporter saves the annotations to files. After locating four case
elements from judgments, we employ
Flexible Exporter to store the annotations for further analysis and visualization.
c 2016 ADFSL

2.4

ANNIE Gazetteer
JAPE Transducer
RegEx Sentence Splitter
JAPE Transducer
ANNIE Gazetteer
JAPE Transducer
ANNIE Gazetteer
JAPE Transducer
RegEx Sentence Splitter
ANNIE Gazetteer
JAPE Transducer
RegEx Sentence Splitter
ANNIE Gazetteer
JAPE Transducer
JAPE Transducer
ANNIE Gazetteer

JAPE Transducer

Verifying Annotation
Coverage

Table 3 presents the number of judgments
collected, the average character count, and
the number of case element not found according to different judgment types. Since
there is no frequently used term to indicate
the intent in Chinese judgments, we fail to
extract the intent element from 134 Chinese
judgments, from which we can observe that
the pre-defined words in ANNIE Gazetteer
lists greatly influence the accuracy of element extraction. Analysing the annotation coverage from the judgment types, we
fail to extract almost all the case elements
from 26 Taiwanese judgments of civil action and mediation types due to the lack
of element in these judgments. Moreover,
since we utilize RegEx Sentence Splitter
to locate the linguistic markers as the separator between the decision and intent elements for Taiwanese judgments, extracting
the decision element will fail if there is no
separator for RegEx Sentence Splitter to
Page 41
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locate. Not every Taiwanese judgment has
the same judgment stages, even though Taiwanese judgments have more identifiable linguistic markers to separate judgment stages
than Chinese judgments.
Table 3. A Summary of Collected Chinese
and Taiwanese Judgments
China
Avg. Char Judgment Number of Case Element not Found
Count
Number
Decision Intent Fact Evidence
4160.06
302
4
110
3
22
5922.93
56
42
24
12
17
Taiwan
prosecution
5801.13
331
32
119
121
199
summary judgment
2820.58
318
14
97
97
149
appeal
5138.14
50
2
13
13
22
civil action
677.52
23
18
23
23
23
private prosecution
5145.40
5
1
1
1
2
mediation
513.00
3
3
3
3
3
Judgment
Type
first instance
appeal

2.5

Judgment Analysis
Findings

After analysing 1,088 “computer as a target”
judgments through case element extraction,
we describe the major findings as follows:
2.5.1

Effectiveness of Case Elements

The decision element serves as a good criterion to analyse the scale of sentence severity for cross-jurisdictional comparisons. Regarding not guilty as zero days, the average
length of imprisonment is 962.07 days based
on the decision elements extracted from Chinese judgments. On the other hand, the
average length of imprisonment is 170.46
days according to Taiwanese decision elements, which is not that severe compared to
the maximum three or five years imprisonment regulated in criminal code on offenses
against the computer security. We can observe the defendants who commit computer
crime tend to be sentenced more severely in
China than those in Taiwan, even though
the number of judgments collected in China
is less than in Taiwan. Note that the written numbers are different between Taiwanese
and Chinese judgments; most of Taiwanese
judgments use financial characters, whereas
Chinese judgments use normal characters.
Page 42
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Studying the intent element is beneficial
for future risk assessment, even though it is
difficult to have solid evidence to prove the
intent of a defendant. Since threat is one
of the indispensable components of risk, and
threat possesses intent and capability, examining the intent element is advantageous for
risk assessment and determining the level of
security control to protect information assets. According to 224 intent elements extracted from Chinese judgments, the most
common intent is to gain the illegal benefits.
On the other hand, based on 474 intent elements extracted from Taiwanese judgments,
the intent “for purpose to exercise unlawful
control over others property” is more popular than the intent of gaining the illegal benefits.
The fact elements extracted are well constructed and describe the events that previously occurred in narrative forms, which
can facilitate the analysis of criminal activities for further crime scenario construction and offender profiling. Based on 343
fact elements extracted from Chinese judgments, the common activities include installing Trojan horse for stealing money from
on-line accounts, and even selling bots for
distributed denial-of-service attacks. According to 472 fact elements extracted Taiwanese judgments, the most common behaviour is the illegal possession of others’ accounts.
Analysing the evidence element facilitates
the preparation of evidence before the occurrence of legal actions. An organization
should establish an information retention
strategy to prepare for upcoming legal disclosure (International Organization for Standardization, 2015), which can be easily clarified by analysing the evidence used against
a defendant from previous judgments. However, based on the total 651 evidence elements extracted Chinese and Taiwanese
judgments, we observe the digital evidence
c 2016 ADFSL
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supporting the “computer as a target” cases
rarely stands alone. Even the “computer as
a target” cases still depend heavily on nondigital evidence, such as testimonials, documents, or confessions.
2.5.2 Transformation into
Argumentation Diagrams

tom for better comprehensibility of criminal
activities. We also categorize the evidence
element into digital evidence and non-digital
evidence to demonstrate that the “computer
as a target” judgments do not depend heavily on digital evidence as expected.

Based on the case elements extracted from
judgments, we can follow the concepts of datum and claim from the Toulmin model of
argument (Toulmin, 2003), which are shown
in Figure 2, to develop an automatic judgment summarizing system. Taking the file
generated by Flexible Exporter as input,
we visualize the case elements with DOT, a
plain text graph description language, and
employ Graphviz (Ellson, Gansner, Koutsofios, North, & Woodhull, 2001), an open
source graph drawing tool, to convert the
DOT files to PDF files.
Evidence

Evidence

Collecting Legal Texts
Web crawler: Scrapy

Legal Text Engineering
language engineering software: GATE
RegEx Sentence Splitter
GATE Unicode Tokeniser
ANNIE Gazetteer
JAPE Transducer
Flexible Exporter

Visualizing Case Elements
graph visualization software: Graphviz

Evidence

output

dependencies

Intent

Fact

Fact

Decision

support

support

Decision

Decision

Guilty

Not Guilty

Intent
Fact

Figure 2. Transformation of Case Elements
into Argumentation Diagrams
Figure 3 presents an overview of the measures and procedures for automatic judgment summarization. Figure 4 presents an
automatically generated argumentation diagram from a Chinese judgment. Using rectangles to represent a fact or an observation
and ovals to present a consequent assertion
(Shum, 2003), we summarize the “computer
as a target” judgments automatically in a
consistent format, which can enhance the
accessibility and readability of judgments.
Since the fact element describes the previously occurred events in chronological order, we divide the fact element into shorter
phrases, and list the phrases from top to botc 2016 ADFSL

dependencies

Digital Evidence

dependencies

Non-Digital Evidence

Figure 3. An Overview of an Automatic
Judgment Summarizing System
2.5.3

Grounds of Inadmissibility

The gathered evidence only become admissible when it meets the criteria of relevance
and reliability. Based on collected Chinese and Taiwanese judgments, the grounds
of inadmissibility include processed by unqualified personnel, diverse malware analysis result, inaccurate calculation of monetary
value, no evidential connection, reasonable
doubt, etc. Analysis outcomes of the admissibility and inadmissibility of evidence from
Page 43
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判处有期徒刑三年三个月

Intent

被告人朴文华以非法占有为目的

2014年1月至6月期间
Fact 被告人朴文华利用发送木马程序从赌博网站计算机信息系统中非法获取易宝账号及密码身份认证信息34组
并将部分易宝账户内资金共计109664元转入其个人使用的卡号为建设银行43×××91账户

3. EVIDENTIAL
REASONING OF
KERNEL TRACES

Non-Digital Evidence
被告人在开庭审理过程中亦无异议

Digital Evidence
身份认证信息数据整理记录
电子证据检查工作记录
电子数据检验鉴定意见
易宝账号及密码等计算机信息系统数据
木马程序等电子数据等证据证实

且有书证户籍证明
案件来源
抓捕经过
刑事判决书
易宝支付有限公司交易出款记录查询明细
银行交易明细
证据保全清单
冻结财产通知书回执
情况说明
照片
证人柏某的证言
搜查笔录
检查笔录

Figure 4. An Automatically Generated Argumentation Diagram from a Chinese Judgment

the “computer as a target” judgments are
valuable inputs for probability assessment.
Extracting 5W1H information and other factors affecting the scale of sentence severity
can also assist the calculation of probabilities.

2.5.4

Need for Forensic Readiness

Since the criminal activities targeting at
computers demand more technical knowledge than general criminal cases, the “computer as a target” judgments are supposed
to depend heavily on digital evidence. However, based on the evidence elements extracted, we discover the digital evidence
rarely stands alone, even for supporting the
“computer as a target” cases. Moreover,
since the number of incidents reported are
much more than the number of judgments,
there must be many “computer as a target”
cases closed before being brought to courts.
It is essential for organisations to prepare
themselves for digital forensics with reliable
digital evidence, in other words- forensic
readiness.
Page 44

To learn from the past, we analyse previous
“computer as a target” judgments for evidential reasoning in Section 2. To set out
the future, organisations can prepare themselves for upcoming legal disclosure with reliable digital evidence, such as kernel traces,
the low-level execution logs of operating systems (Giraldeau, Desfossez, Goulet, Dagenais, & Desnoyers, 2011). To conduct evidential reasoning of kernel traces for forensic readiness, we propose a framework by
integrating the narrative methods from attack graphs/languages, the argumentative
methods from argumentation diagrams, and
the probabilistic methods from Bayesian networks, which is shown in Figure 5.

3.1

Related Work

Distinguished from previous studies on
method integration for evidential reasoning
and interpretation, which are summarized in
Table 4, we employ the narrative methods
from attack graphs and attack description
languages to emphasise the investigation of
information security incidents in this paper.

Table 4. A Summary of Method Integration
for Evidential Reasoning
Author(s)
Hepler et al.
F. J. Bex et al.
Condliffe et al.
Vlek et al.
Verheij
Timmer et al.

Methods
Narrative Argumentative
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

Probabilistic
x
x
x
x
x

c 2016 ADFSL
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Proposed Framework

Knowledge Base

Example

Kernel traces

Condition

Condition

Condition

[reliability module]

[reliability module]

[reliability module]

[reliability module]

IDS database

Network connect()
File access()

Network send()
File chown()

Signal kill()
File rmdir()

Process execve()
File chmod()

dependencies

[reliability module]

Scenario

Scenario

[probability module]

Gather information

Gain access

Cover tracks

[probability module]

Elements of crimes

inferences

[reliability module]

Legal idiom

Legal idiom

Legal idiom

[probability module]

[probability module]

[probability module]

support

Intent

Explaining-away

support

Hypothesis

Hypothesis

[probability module]

[probability module]

Guilty

Not guilty

Figure 5. The Framework for Evidential Reasoning of Kernel Traces

3.2

Producing Scenarios
through Attack
Graphs/Languages

Producing scenarios automatically can reduce the possibility of bias and errors.
Once a suspect has been targeted, the evidence gathering process tends to become restricted to supporting the guilt of the suspect. To keep investigators from the confirmation bias, we suggest to employ the essential elements of attack description languages (Cuppens & Ortalo, 2000; Templeton
& Levitt, 2000; Cheung, Lindqvist, & Fong,
2003): pre-conditions (require capabilities)
and post-conditions (provide capabilities) as
datums, and scenarios as claims, to produce
scenarios automatically from kernel traces.
Attack graphs aim to represent the potential intrusion paths for security vulnerability analysis, whereas attack description languages usually address the generic description issues for knowledge interchange. Despite the differences, both of them are effective narrative methods to demonstrate information security incidents. Table 5 summarizes the elements to present information
security incidents in a narrative form. The
pre-condition is the set of resources required
for an attack to occur (e.g. the host vulnerability information and the communication connectivity), the scenario is the set of
c 2016 ADFSL

events of an attack, and the post-condition is
the set of resources obtained by a successful
attack.
Table 5. A Summary of Attack Graphs and
Languages
Author(s)
Phillips and Swiler
Ortalo et al.
Cuppens and Ortalo
Ritchey and Ammann
Templeton and Levitt
Eckmann et al.
Michel and M
Cheung et al.
Noel et al.
Ou et al.

Graph/Language Elements
Nodes
Edges
Edge Weight
stages of attack
actions, conditions success probability
privileges
vulnerabilities
efforts required
pre-condition, post-condition, scenario, detection, verification
hosts, connectivity matrix, exploits
require capabilities, provide capabilities, actions
states, transitions
exploit, detection, response
pre-condition, post-condition
exploits, conditions
dependencies
hardening costs
attack goal, derivation, fact dependencies
n/a

The scenario producing process requires
the knowledge similar to the database of intrusion detection systems, which holds the
security-related events correlated based on
different system resources (e.g. file system,
process management, and network). Using system resources for correlation not only
increases the possibility of integrating kernel traces from other operating systems, but
also enhances the comprehensibility of attack stages. Since the post-condition of a
scenario can be the pre-condition of the following scenario, it is effortless to understand
the intent of acquiring specific system resources.
For instance, if the database of securityrelated events defines the scenario of gathering information as pre-conditions of initiating a connection on a socket and checkPage 45
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ing user’s permissions for a file, and postconditions of sending a message on a socket
and changing ownership of a file, we can produce the scenario of gathering information
automatically from gathered kernel traces.
Similarly, we can produce the scenario of
covering tracks with pre-conditions of executing program and changing permissions of
a file, and post-conditions of sending signal
to a process and deleting a directory.

3.3

Generating Hypotheses
through Argumentation
Diagrams

Convicting a defendant demands constructing legal arguments. To assist investigators to construct legal arguments, we suggest to employ the concepts of datum and
claim from the Toulmin model of argument
(Toulmin, 2003) and legal idioms, such as
evidence-accuracy idioms and intent idioms
(Fenton, Neil, & Lagnado, 2013), for hypothesis generation.
Argumentation diagrams aim to represent
the structure of an argument visually, which
can facilitate the crime scenario construction, crime investigation, and decision support from a legal perspective. However, argument diagramming requires facts, arguments, and evidence as input data, which
mainly depends on manual user input. Table 6 summarizes the elements to represent
information security incidents in an argumentative form.
Table 6. A Summary of Argumentation Diagrams
Author(s)
Goodwin
Toulmin
Verheij
Reed and Rowe
Chesevar et al.
Keppens and Schafer
F. Bex et al.
Gordon

Graph Elements
Nodes
Edges
facts
probative processes
datum, warrant, claim, backing, rebuttal certainty
statements
support/attack
reconstructed enthymemes, refutations
support
claims, applications of schemes
support
facts, evidence, assumptions, hypothesis causal relations
data, inference, scheme
inferential relations
statements, testimonial evidence
inferential relations

Edge Weight
belief strength
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
argument strength

An automatic judgment summarizing system, which we have developed in Section 2,
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can minimize the manual effort required for
hypothesis generation and provide knowledge for developing legal idioms from scenarios. Examining the evidence used against
a defendant from previous judgments constantly can also solidify legal cases and avoid
repeating past mistakes. The decision element corresponds to hypotheses, the intent
and fact elements fit into legal idioms, and
the scenarios can be considered as evidence
in narrative forms. The legal idioms developed can establish attack or support relations with the hypotheses generated, which
are normally mutually exclusive. For example, Figure 5 consists of two mutually exclusive hypotheses: the intruder is guilty or not
guilty.

3.4

Assessing Probabilities
through Bayesian
Networks

From a legal perspective, Bayesian networks
can facilitate the interpretation of complicated relations between evidence, the modelling of legal arguments and crime scenarios,
and the process of evidential reasoning. To
assist investigators to discover of the most
supported hypotheses, we suggest to employ
the qualitative probability (Keppens, 2007)
from Bayesian networks for probability assessment.
Bayesian networks aim to present variables and their probabilistic relations in a
directed acyclic graph. Table 7 summarizes
the elements to present information security incidents in a probabilistic form. Even
though Bayesian networks can present variables and their probabilistic relations in accurate numbers, these numerical probabilities demand huge amount of knowledge as
input for calculation.
The gathered evidence only become admissible when it meets the criteria of relevance and reliability. Since the developed
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Table 7. A Summary of Bayesian Networks
Regarding Legal Reasoning
Author(s)
Zukerman et al.
Hepler et al.
Keppens
F. J. Bex et al.
Condliffe et al.
Keppens
Fenton et al.
Vlek et al.
Verheij
Timmer et al.

Graph Elements
Nodes
Edges
propositions
inferences
modules, variables
inferred hierarchy
variables
influences
observations, arguments, evidence inferences
evidence variables
inferred hierarchy
variables
inference
basic causal structures
causal inferences
scenarios
dependencies
hypotheses, evidence
inferences
support factors
support

Edge Weight
n/a
n/a
qualitative derivatives
n/a
n/a
probative force
probability
n/a
strengths
likelihood ratio

legal idioms attack or support the generated
hypotheses, the datums and the claims connected to the legal idioms should be considered relevant. As for reliability, since a datum is a fact or an observation, and a claim
is a consequent assertion that depends on
datums (Shum, 2003), based on the object
oriented concept (Hepler et al., 2007), we
suggest to assign a reliability module and a
qualitative probability module to each datum and claim respectively.
A reliability module should contain a conditional probability table from Bayesian networks, which can be derived from potential errors identified and vulnerability assessment outcomes. For instance, we can use
the detection rate and false alarm rate as input for the reliability module of the intrusion
detection system database required for producing scenarios. Thus, we can make errors
present and transparent for a fair trial.
Since the comparison between different
hypotheses does not require precise numerical probabilities, the qualitative approach
is enough in the context of forensic analysis
(Keppens, 2007). We suggest employing the
analysis of inadmissibility grounds as input
for calculation, assigning a qualitative probability module to a claim, and using different
levels of edge thickness to indicate different
levels of probability. For instance, we can
utilize sliders to present scales of probability, which are shown in Figure 5.
c 2016 ADFSL
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4. CONCLUSIONS
AND FUTURE WORK
Inspired by the feasibility of extracting
legal knowledge for argument construction and employing grounds of inadmissibility for probability assessment, we integrate the narrative methods from attack
graphs/languages, the argumentative methods from argumentation diagrams, and the
probabilistic methods from Bayesian networks, to conduct evidential reasoning of
kernel traces for forensic readiness.
Employing the elements of pre-condition
and post-condition from attack description
languages, we can keep investigators from
confirmation bias, clarify the stages of attacks, and prevent miscarriages of justice.
Following the concepts of datum and claim
from argumentation diagrams, we can assist
investigators to construct legal arguments.
Moreover, the automatic judgement summarizing system developed can help investigators to solidify legal cases and avoid repeating past mistakes. Utilizing the ideas of legal idioms and qualitative probability from
Bayesian networks, we can assist investigators to discover of the most supported hypotheses and assess the admissibility of gathered evidence.
In addition to broadening the judgment
analysis scope for conducting comprehensive
cross-jurisdictional comparisons, we plan to
conduct a case study for evaluating the effectiveness of the proposed framework, and
broaden the element scope for deeper legal
knowledge extraction, such as 5W1H information. We also need to ensure the privacy
implications for users are minimized to acceptable levels to alleviate the conflicts between accountability and privacy. We will
make the raw data and source code available
to interested researchers under an appropriate open source licenses.
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